如今中国想进入高附加值产品和服务业的行列，就意味着下一阶段的经济发展需要在人才上投放更多的资源，官方已经明确表态，他们将以建设高速公路的决心来建设人才队伍。自1998年以来，北京已经大规模地将资源投放到教育上，投放总额接近GDP总量的三倍。近十年来，中国的高等院校已经翻番，学生增加五倍，从1997年的100万增加到2007年的550万。中国遴选出9所顶级高校组成中国版的常春藤。当欧洲和美国的大学受到大规模减免预算的冲击时，中国反其道而行之。今年早些时候，耶鲁大学校长Richard Levin在一次演说中指出：“中国高校的扩充规模史无前例，她仅用10年的时间，就建立了世界上最大规模的高校体系。自新千年以来，中国大专院校学生所增加的人数超过美国同类别学生的总数。”

这种对教育空前的投入，对中国还有美国意味着什么?诺贝尔经济学奖获得者、芝加哥大学教授Robert Fogel预测，受过良好培训的工人对经济影响深刻。在美国，与一个受过9年义务教育的工人相比，一个高中毕业生的产能是其1.8倍，大学毕业生是其3倍。中国正在不断地扩充其高中和大学毕业生的人数。中国的服务业与印度相比还有相当大的差距，因为印度学生的英语和技术培训更占优势。但中国的公司最终将打入这片广阔的领域，因为中国学生的语言能力和技能培训正在逐步提高。Fogel相信，随着中国高技术工人的增加，中国经济的年均增长率将大幅度增长，到2040年，其GDP将会去到令世人惊叹的123万亿美元。按他的预测，届时中国将成为全球最大的经济体。

不能靠“威胁和关税”回击

不管这个不可思议的数字是否正确(我认为Fogel对中国的增长过分乐观)，但毫无疑问的是，中国正在向上游产业和高附加值的工作转移，这些领域直到现在还在被西方国家认为是他们的专利，这才是来自中国的真正挑战。这不是因为北京操控汇率或暗中补贴，而是中国战略投资和中国人刻苦耐劳形成的挑战。对这种挑战最有力的回击不是威胁和关税，而是深度的结构改革以及新的重点投资，使得美国的经济更有活力，美国工人更具竞争力。这需要民主和共和两党达成共识。

在以美国次贷危机引发的世界金融危机和经济危机爆发以来，世界各国的汇率随金融市场的波动而剧烈波动，给各国的经济稳定带来极大的不利影响。特别是后危机时代美国经济复苏缓慢，失业严重，美国国会少数议员为了转移国内视线，无端指责中国操纵人民币汇率，以人民币汇率大幅低估来获取贸易顺差。上月底，美国众议院甚至通过试图以贸易制裁中国压迫人民币大幅升值的法案。近期，美国通过量化宽松货币政策诱使美元对世界各国货币大幅度贬值，一场新的货币大战或隐或现。美国国会不断向中国施压，要求人民币升值。美国财政部还要求国际货币基金组织进行干预，以促使中国实施灵活的汇率政策。巴西、日本和其他亚洲经济体的各央行也已为稳定本国货币而出手干预。为了及时准确地反映人民币综合汇率的整体走势，以客观的事实和科学的依据为国家制定汇率政策，为企业、机构和个人规避汇率风险，正确引导公众的汇率预期，开发人民币汇率指数具有重要现实意义和战略意义。

The global economy

How to stop a currency war

Keep calm, don’t expect quick fixes and above all don’t unleash a trade fight with China

Economist Oct 14th 2010

IN RECENT weeks the world economy has been on a war footing, at least rhetorically. Ever since Brazil’s finance minister, Guido Mantega, declared on September 27th that an “international currency war” had broken out, the global economic debate has been recast in battlefield terms, not just by excitable headline-writers, but by officials themselves. Gone is the fuzzy rhetoric about co-operation to boost global growth. A more combative tone has taken hold. Countries blame each other for distorting global demand, with weapons that range from quantitative (量的;用量表示的;与数量有关的) easing (printing money to buy bonds) to currency intervention and capital controls.

Behind all the smoke and fury, there are in fact three battles. The biggest one is over China’s unwillingness to allow the yuan to rise more quickly. American and European officials have sounded tougher about the “damaging dynamic” caused by China’s undervalued currency. Last month the House of Representatives passed a law allowing firms to seek tariff protection against countries with undervalued currencies, with a huge bipartisan(两个政党的) majority. China’s “unfair” trade practices have become a hot topic in the mid-term elections.

A second flashpoint is the rich world’s monetary policy, particularly the prospect that central banks may soon restart printing money to buy government bonds. The dollar has fallen as financial markets expect the Federal Reserve to act fastest and most boldly. The euro has soared as officials at the European Central Bank show least enthusiasm for such a shift. In China’s eyes (and, sotto voce, those of many other emerging-market governments), quantitative easing creates a gross distortion in the world economy as investors rush elsewhere, especially into emerging economies, in search of higher yields.

A third area of contention comes from how the developing countries respond to these capital flows. Rather than let their exchange rates soar, many governments have intervened to buy foreign currency, or imposed taxes on foreign capital inflows. Brazil recently doubled a tax on foreign purchases of its domestic debt. This week Thailand announced a new 15% withholding tax for foreign investors in its bonds.

Jaw-jaw, please

For now, these skirmishes fall far short of a real currency war. Many of the “weapons” look less menacing on closer inspection. The capital-inflow controls are modest. In the rich world only Japan has recently resorted to currency intervention, and so far only once. Nor is there much risk of an imminent (危险等逼近的;即将发生的)descent into trade retaliation(报复). Even in America, tariffs against China are still, with luck, a long way off—both because the currency bill is milder than it sounds and because it has yet to be passed by the Senate or signed by Barack Obama.

Still, there is no room for complacency(满足;自满) Today’s phoney war could quickly turn into a real dogfight. The conditions driving the divergence(分歧) of economic policies—in particular, sluggish(怠惰的 )growth in the rich world—are likely to last for years. As fiscal austerity(朴素, 节俭;苦行)kicks in, the appeal of using a cheaper currency as a source of demand will increase, and the pressure on politicians to treat China as a scapegoat will rise. And if the flood of foreign capital intensifies, developing countries may be forced to choose between losing competitiveness, truly draconian(古代执政官的, 严峻的)capital controls or allowing their economies to overheat.

What needs to happen is fairly clear. Global demand needs rebalancing, away from indebted rich economies and towards more spending in the emerging world. Structural reforms to boost spending in those surplus economies will help, but their real exchange rates also need to appreciate(增值). And, yes, the Chinese yuan is too low. That is hurting not just the West but also other emerging countries (especially those with floating exchange rates) and indeed China itself, which needs to get more of its growth from domestic consumption.

It is also clear that this will not be a painless process. China is right to worry about instability if workers in exporting companies lose their jobs. And even reasonable choices—such as the rich world’s mix of fiscal austerity and loose monetary policy—will have an uncomfortable impact on small, open emerging economies, in the form of unwelcome capital inflows. This flood of capital will be less devastating to them than the harm they would suffer if the West descended into deflation(通货紧缩)and stagnation, but it can still cause problems.

Collective Seoul-searching

All this cries out for a multilateral approach, in which institutions such as the IMF and the G20 forge consensus among the big economies. The hitch is that the multilateral route has, so far, achieved little. Hence the chorus calling for a different line of attack—one that focuses on getting tough with China, through either retaliatory capital controls (such as not allowing China to buy American Treasury bonds) or trade sanctions([ pl.]国际制裁). And it is not just the usual protectionist suspects: even some free-traders reckon that economic violence is the only way to shock China out of its self-harming obstinacy(顽固;(病痛等)难治)(and to stop a more widespread protectionist reaction later).

This newspaper is not convinced. The threats look like either unworkable bluffs (how can China be stopped from buying Treasuries, the most widely traded asset in the world’s financial markets?) or dangerous provocations(刺激;用于尝试性解决问题). Confronted with a trade ultimatum(最后通牒), the Beijing regime, puffed up in its G2 hubris, may well reckon it is cheaper politically to retaliate to the United States in kind. That is how trade wars start.

Anyway, to focus on America and China is to misunderstand the nature of the problem. The currency wars are about more than one villain and one victim. Rather, redouble multilateral efforts behind the scenes, especially by bringing in the emerging countries hurt by China’s policy. Brazil and others have only just begun to speak out. South Korea is hosting the G20 next month. Use the Seoul summit as a prompt, not to create some new Plaza Accord (today’s tensions are too complex to settle in a grand peace treaty of the sort hammered out by just five countries in New York in 1985) but as a way to clarify the debate and keep up the pressure. It will get fewer headlines; but this is a war that is best averted, not fought.